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Some Suggestions for
a Model Estates Code
Any model law must be forward-looking to be useful as
a guide for the form and content of statutes of various
jurisdictions. The American Bar Association has recently
undertaken a revision of the Model Probate Code, an
occasion appropriate for reflection about what probate
law ought to be. In this Article, Professor Boyd sets forth
his proposals concerning the scope of a probate code,
notice in probate proceedings, and fiduciary powers and
duties. He concludes that the revisers should not simply
redraft a few provisions of the existing code, but should
seek an integrated statutory approach to the problems of
trust, probate, and guardianship administration through
the adoption of a Model Estates Code.

Willard L. Boyd*
Seventeen years have elapsed since the publication of the
Model Probate Code. This masterful code and the monographs
accompanying it were prepared by Professor Lewis M. Simes and
Paul E. Basye.1 The work of these two men and their colleagues
has been both cause and effect in the revision of American probate law since 1946.' The Code has substantially influenced probate revisions in Arkansas,' Indiana,4 Iowa,5 Missouri,' North Car* Professor of Law, State University of Iowa. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Lester Johnson of the third-year class at
Iowa Law School and of the members of the Special Committee on Probate Law of the Iowa State Bar Association.

1. In addition, three articles written by Professor Thomas E. Atkinson
were among the significant factors responsible for the preparation of the

Model Probate Code. Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications
of Probate Judges, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOc'Y 93 (1939); Old Principles and
New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure, id. at 137; Wanted-A
Model ProbateCode, id. at 183 (1940).
2. Straus, Wanted: A Model Probate Code, I American College of

Probate Counsel, Newsletter, No. 7, Feb. 1963.

3. ARK. STAT. §§ 57-101 to 58-408, 60-101 to -3109 (Supp. 1961).
4. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-101 to 8-218 (1953).
5. IOWA PROBATE CODE §§ 1-718 (1963). [The probate provisions
of the Iowa Code were substantially revised by the 1963 Iowa General

Assembly; the revised provisions, without chapter number, are hereinafter
cited as IOWA PROBATE CODE (1963).]

6. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 472.010-475.480 (1959).
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olina,7 Pennsylvania," and Texas.9
In the period since the drafting of the Model Probate Code,
a veritable revolution has occurred with respect to estates. Provisions for the marital deduction in the Revenue Act of 1948,10
along with post-war productivity and inflation, have made every
lawyer an estate planner. Moreover, a redefining of procedural
due process and notice occurred in 1950 with the Supreme Court
decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co." In
light of these and other changed conditions, it is appropriate that
the Council of the Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association has concluded that the Model
Probate Code should be revised. The Council has entrusted this
work to an outstanding committee, 2 and this committee is maintaining close contact with a special committee of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws" interested in the feasibility of
a uniform probate code.
Uniformity in the law governing estate planning and administration is both possible and necessary. Notwithstanding the local
nature of this law, the diversity in the applicable state law is not
as great as might be presumed. Common principles and techniques
do exist, and their existence makes it possible to draft model and
uniform statutes. Furthermore, the mobility and consequent dispersion of American property holders, their beneficiaries, and their
assets, make uniformity essential, for estate problems are becoming increasingly national in scope.
The task confronting the revisers of the Model Probate Code is
a prodigious one. Not only is the subject matter vast, but also
every lawyer has particularized opinions as to what this law ought
to be. In examining proposed legislation dealing with estates, lawyers tend to consider general solutions in terms of the specific cases
in which they have been involved. This approach can be beneficial
in exposing faulty draftmanship and neglected problems, but in
some instances a broader view is required.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-1 to 37-15 (Supp. 1961).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1.1-3470.15 (Supp. 1962).

9. TEX. PROB. CODE §§ 1-434 (Supp. 1962).
10. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117 (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056), ch. 168, § 372, 62 Stat. 125 (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523).
11. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
12. Paul E. Basye, Chairman; Laura Andreas; Allison Dunham; Harrison F. Durand; William F. Fratcher; Russell D. Niles; Lewis M. Simes. Professor Fratcher is directing the research of the Committee.
13. Clarke A. Gravel; Fred T. Hanson; Judge James T. Harrison; Charles
Horowitz; George D. Locke; Herbert H. McAdams; Harvey S. Reynolds;
Judge Sverre Roang; Clarence Swainson; Joe W. Worley.
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In spite of these difficulties, the revisers will find the American bar receptive to their efforts. Most lawyers realize that codification of common law and good practice will expedite and improve
estate planning and administration. In addition, the realities of
practice, coupled with extensive and continuing legal education,
have mide the bar more receptive to innovation in this field. The
acceptance of probate revisions based on the Model Probate
Code by rural-oriented legislatures demonstrates a willingness to
meet the common needs of country and city clients. Thus, the time
for revision is propitious, and a broad approach to the subject is
desirable. Among the significant questions that must be considered
by the revisers are the scope of the Code, notice in probate proceedings, and general provisions relating to fiduciaries. This Article
sets forth proposals in each of these areas.
I. SCOPE OF A PROBATE CODE
Any revision of the Model Probate Code must begin with an
expansion in the scope of the Code. Modern estate planning and
administration, concerned as it is with probate, guardianship, and
trust law, requires a comprehensive and integrated statutory statement of the law in these fields. Numerous uniform and model
acts promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
both before 4 and after 5 the Model Probate Code attest to this
14. The following uniform acts were approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prior to 1946: UNIFORM
FIDuCIARIEs ACT (1922); UNIFORM VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP ACT (1928)
(rev. 1942) (Part IV incorporated in the Model Probate Code); UNiFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (1931) (amend. 1958, rev. 1962);
UNIFORM TRUSTEES' ACCOUNTING ACT (1936); UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT
(1937); UNIFORM COMMON TRUST FUND ACT (1938) (amend. 1952);
UNIFORM ABSENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY
ACT (1939); UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (1940) (amend. 1953);
UNIFORM ACT GOVERNING SECURED CREDITORS' DIVIDENDS IN LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS (1941) (§ 139 incorporated in the Model Probate Code);
UNIFORM POWERS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES ACT (1944) (Part V
incorporated in the Model Probate Code). See also MODEL EXECUTION
OF WILLS ACT (1940) (§§ 45-50 incorporated in the Model Probate
Code); MODEL CY-PREs ACT (1944). The draftsmen of the Model Probate
Code also suggested that certain other acts prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were related to the subject matter of the Probate Code and could be consulted in revising a state
code. MODEL PROBATE CODE 12 (Simes 1946). Among those acts listed
were: UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (1918); UNIFORM ILLEGITIMACY ACT (1922); UNIFORM
JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT (1925); UNIFORM RECIPROCAL TRANSFER TAX
ACT (1928); UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT (1938); MODEL WAR SERVICE VALIDATION ACT (1944).
15. The following uniform acts have been approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws since 1946: UNI-
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interrelationship. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of these separate
acts confounds and confuses state committees charged with the responsibility of producing a unified code governing estates. Since
the Uniform Commissioners desire to co-operate in the revision of
the Model Probate Code, the time has come both to review the
adequacy of the older uniform and model acts affecting estate
planning and to incorporate all relevant acts into a single estates code.
Ideally, an estates code should constitute an extensive treatment
of the law of trusts, of guardianships, and of decedents' estates and
their administration. 6 Short of this, there are two minimum requirements of any statutory revision affecting estates. The first is to
vest in one court the jurisdiction to administer all such estates; the

second is an omnibus procedure for securing judicial determination
of problems arising out of the administration of these estates.

A.

CONSOLIDATION OF JURISDICTION OVER ESTATES AND TRUSTS

Prior to the drafting of the Model Probate Code, Professor
Thomas Atkinson argued for a more competent probate judiciary. 7
He noted that the jurisdiction of the probate court had been expanded in a number of states to include broader powers over the
estates of decedents, minors, and incompetents. Because of growth
in the size and complexities of these estates, he contended that layFORM ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES ACT (1949) (amend. 1953)

(Part V incorporated in the Model Probate Code); UNIFORM PROBATE
OF FOREIGN WILLS ACT (1950) (recommended that this act be incorporated
in the Model Probate Code); UNIFORM SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR
UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT (1958); UNIFORM ACT
(1956); UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT (1955);
UNIFORM

ESTATE

TAX APPORTIONMENT

ACT

(1958);

UNIFORM

ACT

FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS (1958); TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT (1960). See also MODEL SMALL EsTATES ACT (1951). In addition, the Conference has a special committee
working on the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act; the committee expects to
have a first tentative draft of an act ready for presentation at the annual
meeting of the Conference in August, 1963.
The Committee on Fiduciary Legislation of the Trust Division of the
American Bankers Association has prepared several model acts relating to
estates. See TRUST DIV., THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, TRUST AND
ESTATE LEGISLATION (1961).

16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 101-4103 (1953): Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 456.010-475.480 (1959) (although the probate code only
includes probate and guardianship, it is under the same title as trusts);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-1 to 37-15 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 1-3414 (1950), § 3441-3611 (Supp. 1962).
17. Atkinson, Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of
Probate Judges, 23 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 93, 94-97 (1939); accord,
SIMps & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 421-23, 466-82, 486-88
(1946).
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men should be prohibited from serving as probate judges and
that part-time probate courts should be abolished. As a practical alternative, he urged that there be a single court of general jurisdiction having equity, law, and probate powers. Although Professor
Atkinson was concerned about the quality of the probate bench,
his suggestion also provides an opportunity for greater co-ordination in the administration of estates.
The need for this co-ordination is recognized by section 6 of the
Model Probate Code, which grants to a single court jurisdiction to
administer testamentary trusts as well as decedents' and guardianship estates.' 8 Unfortunately, the administration of inter vivos
trusts is not included within the jurisdiction of the same court.
The draftsmen did, however, acknowledge that there was no valid
reason for distinguishing between testamentary and inter vivos
trusts. They stated that this differentiation poses no problem where
there is a unified court of general jurisdiction, but where the probate courts were separate, the draftsmen favored enacting a separate statutory scheme governing the administration of both inter
vivos and testamentary trusts. 9
Today, there is no longer any justification for refusing to expand the jurisdiction of the probate court to include the administration of inter vivos trusts. Since the advent of the Model Probate
Code, the pour over trust has become a standard estate planning
technique,"0 and it is now common for a decedent's estate to in6 (Simes 1946) provides:
] court shall have plenary jurisdiction of the adminis-

18. MODEL PROBATE CODE §

The [

tration, settlement and distribution of estates of decedents, whether

consisting of real or personal property or both, the probate of wills,

the granting of letters testamentary, of administration and guardianship, the construction of wills, whether incident to the administration
of an estate or as a separate proceeding, the determination of heirship, the administration of testamentary trusts, and the administration
of guardianships of minors and other incompetents. It shall have the
same legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and to
carry out its orders, judgments and decrees, and the same presumptions shall exist as to the validity of such orders, judgments and decrees
in probate as in other matters.
In several states, jurisdiction over testamentary trusts is vested in the
probate court See MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 701.19, 704.1 (1948);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.020 (1959); N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 40. See
also SIMEs & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 462-64 (1946); 1
WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 518-19 (3d ed. 1923).

As to the constitutionality of vesting jurisdiction over testamentary trusts
in the probate court, see MODEL PROBATE CODE 13 (Simes 1946); Summers, Introduction, 25 Mo. ANN. STAT. v (1956).
19. MODEL PROBATE CODE 21-22 (Simes 1946). See also SrMEs &
BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 483-86 (1946) containing an excellent and complete history of probate courts.
20. This fact is evidenced by the promulgation of the Uniform Testa-
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volve problems of inter vivos and testamentary trusts as well as
probate and guardianship. The co-ordination necessary to administer such an estate cannot be achieved solely by providing for
courts of general jurisdiction. In exercising their powers, such
courts are likely to utilize separate divisions or dockets for law,
equity, and probate. As a consequence, traditional differences in
jurisdiction are preserved, and if appropriate relief cannot be obtained in probate, it must be sought in the proper division or
docket by transferring the action or commencing a separate action. This situation impedes the expeditious administration of an

estate having a number of facets. 2 To simplify administration,

jurisdiction over trusts, guardianships, and probate should be vest-

ed in a single division or court22 according to whether a state

mentary Additions to Trust Act. At the time the Model Probate Code was
drafted, pour over wills were sometimes used, but the draftsmen concluded
that this matter was beyond the scope of a probate code. See MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 6, comment (Simes 1946).
21. See 1 MCCARTY, IOWA PROBATE §§ 6, 24 (1942); SIMEs &
BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 417-18, 429, 483-86 (1946).
22. For example, these powers have been combined in IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 4-303, -2910, -3010, -3040 (1946); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 153, § 2 (1954); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 6 (Supp. 1962);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 3.210, 165.130-.140 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 2080.301-.309 (Supp. 1961) (Orphans' Ct.). See also SIMES &
BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 463-64 (1946). In Kansas, the probate court has jurisdiction of all testamentary trusts and of nontestamentary trusts if the beneficiary is subject to guardianship. KAN. GEN. STAT,
ANN. § 59-301 (1949). See also IOWA PROBATE CODE § 10 (1963):
Jurisdiction. The district court sitting in probate shall have jurisdiction of:
1. Estates of decedents and absentees.
The probate and contest of wills; the appointment of personal representatives; the granting of letters testamentary and of administration; the administration, settlement and distribution of estates of decedents and absentees, whether such estates consist of real or personal property or both.
2. Construction of wills and trust instruments.
The construction of wills and trust instruments during the administration of the estate or trust, whether said construction be incident to
such administration or as a separate proceeding.
3. Conservatorships and guardianships.
The appointment of conservators and guardians; the granting of letters of conservatorship and guardianship; the administration, settlement and closing of conservatorships and guardianships.
4. Trusts and trustees.
The appointment of trustees; the granting of letters of trusteeship;
the administration of testamentary trusts; the administration of express
trusts where jurisdiction is specifically conferred on the court by the
trust instrument; the administration of express trusts where the administration of the court is invoked by the trustee, beneficiary or any interested party; the administration of trusts which are established by a
decree of court and result in the administration thereof by the court;
and the settlement and closing of all such trusts.
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has a court of general jurisdiction or an independent probate
court. '3

B.

PROCEDURE
ESTATES

FOR

DEALING

WITH

ADMINISTRATION

OF

The second fundamental requirement of an estates code revision is an adequate procedure by which the court can resolve the
numerous issues arising in the administration of estates. With
respect to decedents' estates and guardianships, this problem is
dealt with extensively throughout the Model Probate Code. For
example, with respect to the construction of a will, the Model
Probate Code utilizes the declaratory judgment procedure z4 it
also notes the applicability of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to probate matters in those jurisdictions that have
adopted that act.' Thus in the United States, the declaratory
judgment procedure has been successfully used to construe wills"
and to determine both heirship 27 and the rights of remaindermen
in estate assets.2 The possibility exists, therefore, that the declar23. See MODEL PROBATE CODE 12-13, 15-16 (Simes 1946).
24. Id. § 60.

25. Id. at 47.
Section 4 of the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act provides:
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir,
next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of
the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a
declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto:
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs,
next of kin or others; or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or
abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the
estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other
writings.
This provision was derived from the English SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE RULES, ORDER LV, Rule 3 (1883) authorizing fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and creditors of decedents' estates and trusts to apply to Chancery
for the determination of their rights and duties. By making declaratory
relief available, it was possible to settle isolated estate issues without resorting to the expensive and complicated administration procedures that had
developed in England at the time. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
226-28 (2d ed. 1941).
26. In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953); Radintz
v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 207 Minn. 56, 289 N.W. 777
(1940); Dickey v. Herbin, 250 N.C. 321, 108 S.E.2d 632 (1959). See generally BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 699-740 (2d ed. 1941).
27. Whisler v. Whisler, 249 Iowa 645, 88 N.W.2d 68 (1958) (intestate
share of surviving spouse); Kane v. Kane, 146 Ohio St. 686, 67 N.E.2d 783
(1946) (determining. heirship in court having concurrent jurisdiction with
probate court).
28. Robinson v. Robinson, 273 Ala. 192, 136 So. 2d 889 (1962); Herbst
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atory judgment procedure might afford a comprehensive technique
for settling questions arising in the administration of estates.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this procedure has
its limitations. To secure relief, a justiciable controversy must exist-a requirement that precludes a fiduciary from using this
method to secure court instructions in the absence of a dispute
with the beneficiaries or creditors. 29 Also, since a declaratory
judgment act is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional statute,
the extent to which this proceeding can be used depends on the
court's jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter."
A declaratory judgment action before a probate court having
jurisdiction over trusts, guardianships, and decedents' estates may
be an in rem, a quasi in rem, or an in personam proceeding, de-

pending on the nature of the interests being adjudicated. Assuming adequate notice to all interested parties, known and unknown, resident and nonresident, the determination would be final as to the res where jurisdiction is in rem or quasi in rem and
as to all persons properly before the court where the proceeding
is in personam.3 Where the declaratory judgment procedure is
v. Treinen, 249 Iowa 695, 88 N.W.2d 820 (1958); Katz Inv. Co. v. Lynch,
242 Iowa 640, 47 N.W.2d 800 (1951).
29. Stetson v. Community Chest, 24 N.J. Super. 243, 93 A.2d 796 (Ch.
1952); Pape v. Title & Trust Co., 187 Ore. 175, 210 P.2d 490 (1949). See
also Fraser, A Survey of Declaratory Judgment Actions in the United States,
39 IOWA L. REV. 639-41 (1954).
30. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF

PROPERTY 741-42 (Casner ed. 1952); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§
57.05, .23 (1953) (Federal Declaratory Judgment Act).
31. Section 11 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides in
part: "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to
the proceeding. . . ... See 1 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 157 (2d ed. 1951); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 272
(2d ed. 1941). See also Schuster v. Schuster, 75 Ariz. 20, 251 P.2d 631
(1952); National Shawmut Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass. 492, 70 N.E.2d 316
(1946); Phillips v. Phillips, 163 Neb. 282, 79 N.W.2d 420 (1956); Rich
Marina Corp. v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); In re Hosford, 26 N.J. Super. 412, 98 A.2d 332 (Super. Ct. 1953);
In re Stone, 21 N.J. Super. 117, 91 A.2d 1 (Ch. 1952).
But see Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 MICH. L. REV. 737,
742-43 (1956), where the author questions the usefulness of the declaratory judgment procedure as a means for determining descent and
distribution because of the requirement that all interested persons must be
made parties. This requirement does not, however, make all declaratory
judgment actions in personam proceedings. Section 11 of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act serves to satisfy the due process requirement
that interested parties are entitled to reasonable notice of, and an opportunity to be heard in, any proceeding affecting their rights regardless of
whether it is an in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem action. In those jurisdictions where Mr. Basye states that notice at the commencement of a
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made available in probate, it can be resorted to for the construction of inter vivos trust instruments32 and the determination of
other justiciable matters over which the probate court has juris-

diction.'

Declaratory relief may, consequently, prove a conven-

ient and efficient device for settling numerous problems of administration.
II.

NOTICE OF PROBATE PROCEEDINGS

A. MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRuST Co.
The applicability to probate of the notice concepts enunciated
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co." is a highly
contentious issue among some members of the American bar.
Succinct and clear, the decision represents a realistic approach to
notice generally. Left behind are legal concepts that must yield if
effective notice to interested parties is to be achieved and property
rights are to be protected in practice as well as in theory.
The question involved in the Mullane case was whether the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had been vioprobate proceeding eliminates the necessity for further notice when deter-

nuination of descent and distribution is sought, § I I would constitute an additional notice requirement if the determination is sought through the device
of a declaratory judgment. Id. at 743-48.
32. Greenley v. Bynum, 266 Ala. 584, 97 So. 2d 893 (1957) (proceeding in equity); Miller v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 46 Dauph. 212 (Pa.
Orphans! CL, Pa. 1938). See also In re Estate of McKinstry, 34 Ohio Op.
300, 71 N.E.2d 318 (P. Ct. 1946), where the court stated that the Declaratory Judgments Act did not expand the jurisdiction of the probate court,
and the court did not have jurisdiction to construe the terms of an inter
vivos trust. As to construction of inter vivos trust instruments, see generally
2 ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 573 (2d ed. 1951).
33. See id. §§ 575-84; Fraser, supra note 29, at 654. See also IOWA
PROBATE CODE § 11 (1963):
Declaratory judgments-determination of heirship-distribution.
During the administration of an estate, the district court sitting in probate shall have full, legal and equitable powers to make declaratory
judgments in all matters involved in the administration of the estate, including those pertaining to the title of real estate, the determination of heirship, and the distribution of the estate. It shall have full,
legal and equitable powers to enter final orders and decrees in all
probate matters to effectuate its jurisdiction and to carry out its orders, judgments and decrees. The same presumption shall exist as to
the validity of such orders, judgments and decrees in probate as in
other actions.
The term "estate" is defined in § 3(15), which provides:
Estate-the real and personal property of a decedent, a ward, or a
trust, as from time to time changed in form by sale, reinvestment or
otherwise, and augmented by any accretions or additions thereto and
substitutions therefor, or diminished by any decreases and distributions
therefrom.
As to the jurisdiction of the probate court in Iowa, see note 22 supra.
34. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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lated by a statute that authorized a trustee administering a New
York common trust fund to publish notice of the surrogate court
hearing to settle finally the fiduciary's first account. The surrogate
court appointed two attorneys as special guardians to represent
persons known and unknown who did not appear and who had or
might subsequently have an interest in the income or principal of
the common trust fund.
It is imperative to remember that a final decree was sought approving the trustee's management of the common trust fund during
the period covered by the accounting. Since a conclusive settlement
would bar any cause of action that the beneficiaries might have
against the trustee for "negligent or illegal impairments of their
interests"35 during this period, the accounting proceeding could
result in depriving the beneficiaries of a property right. Moreover,
the Court reasoned that a deprivation of the beneficiaries' property
could also occur by the allowance of fees to the special guardians
"who, in [the beneficiaries'] names but without their knowledge,
may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest.""0 Because
property rights were in jeopardy, it was essential that the notice
to the beneficiaries satisfy the requirements of due process.
In developing a notice test, the Court rejected the assertion
that New York's jurisdiction over the accounting proceeding was
predicated on in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem jurisdiction,
and instead chose simply to rely upon the well-established authority of any state to settle the interests of any resident or nonresident person in trusts being administered in its courts so long as
adequate notice is afforded.3" As a criterion for determining
whether due process requirements had been met, the Court stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections . . . . The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance ....
38

In assessing the adequacy of notice in Mullane against this criterion, the Court unequivocally stated that notice published in a
newspaper was not a dependable method of actually informing
persons, particularly if they reside outside the newspaper's usual
35. Id. at 313.
36. Ibid.
37. For an analysis of the nature of the jurisdiction involved in the
Mullane case, see Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the
Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305-12, 319 (1951).

38. 339 U.S. at 314-15.

1963]

MODEL ESTATES CODE

circulation area. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged the propriety of published notice in situations where it was not "reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning", 9
published notice was thus sufficient as to those beneficiaries whose
interests, names, or addresses could not be ascertained with due
diligence.
With respect to the accounting proceeding in Mullane, published notice was deemed ample to notify contingent beneficiaries,
but because of its ineffectiveness as a method of informing, published notice was insufficient as to those present beneficiaries
whose names and addresses were known. As an effective alternative, the trustee was directed to inform personally, at least by
ordinary mail, those resident and nonresident beneficiaries whose
names and addresses were known. The approval of mailed notice
represented a compromise. Personal service of citation on the
known resident and nonresident beneficiaries was unnecessary
in the Mullane case because of the great number of small interests
in a common trust fund. Although not as effective as personal
service, the Court reasoned that mailed notice would reach most
of the trust beneficiaries, and because of their identity of interest, objections to the trustee's accounting raised by some beneficiaries would accrue for the benefit of all. The Court refused,
however, to approve published notice on the basis that the trustee
or special guardian adequately represented the interests of those
beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known.
Mhese beneficiaries do have a resident fiduciary as caretaker of their
interest in this property. But it is their caretaker who in the accounting becomes their adversary. Their trustee is released from giving no-

tice of jeopardy, and no one else is expected to do so. Not even the

special guardian is required or apparently expected to communicate with his ward and client, and, of course, if such a duty were merewould not be
ly transferred from the trustee to the guardian, economy
40
served and more likely the cost would be increased.

Thus, the trustee's duty to inform these beneficiaries exists regardless of the existence of a special guardian.
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that at the time the first
investment was made in the common fund for each trust, the trustee pursuant to statute notified by mail those adult and competent persons whose names and addresses were known and who were
either income beneficiaries of the newly participating trust or remaindermen who would share in the principal if the trust estate
were distributable at the time the notice was mailed. The trustee
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id. at 316-17.
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included in the notice a copy of the statutory provisions relating
to the notice being given and to the judicial settlement of the common trust fund accounts. Referring to the inadequacy of published notice of the accounting proceeding for the income beneficiaries, the Court said:
Certainly sending them a copy of the statute months and perhaps
years in advance does not answer this purpose. The trustee periodically
remits their income to them, and we think that they might reasonably
expect that with or apart from their remittances word might come to
them personally that steps were being taken affecting their interests. 41
B.

IMPACT OF MULLANE ON PROBATE PROCEEDINGS

The impact of the Mullane case on American concepts of notice
has been considerable. The Court has subsequently followed it
in bankruptcy, condemnation, and tax lien foreclosure proceedings,42 and it has also influenced state statutes providing for
published notice.43 While some state courts and legislatures have
construed Mullane narrowly,44 the Court's use of the case in different areas indicates that it has broad application.
As if in anticipation of Mullane, the Model Probate Code prescribed as minimal notice publication plus mailed notice to those
persons whose names and addresses are known,4" and the decision itself has accelerated this linking of publication and mailing
in American probate notice.4" This joinder is justifiable, for like
41. Id. at 318.
42. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (condemnation); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (tax lien foreclosure); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293
(1953) (bankruptcy); see Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257 (1957); Note, 32
WASH. L. REV. 165 (1957).
43. Hayward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Company Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IOWA L. REV.
47 (1950); Vestal, A Decade of Practice Under the Iowa Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 IOWA L. REV. 439, 444-45 (1953).
44. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894
(1953); Note, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.-Statutory
Reaction, 39 IOWA L. REV. 665 (1954); Note, 27 U. CINC. L. REV.
76, 77-78 n.9 (1958).
45. MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 14, 69, 70 (Simes 1946). Generally, notice is to be sent by ordinary mail to all persons whose names and addresses are given in the petition, but registered mail is required to notify
each heir and devisee either of the hearing on the petition for admission
of the will to probate or for the appointment of a general administrator or,
if this is not done, of the appointment of the personal representative. See
SIMES & BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 489 (1946). At the time the
Model Probate Code was published, some states required more than
published notice to the estate beneficiaries. Id. at 522.
46. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-112 (Supp. 1962); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178(32) (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 472.100 (Supp. 1962); Wis.
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a trust proceeding, a probate proceeding is comprised of a series
of orders, many of which should be final. Among the most important final orders the probate court can render are those concerning the admission of a will to probate, the issuance of letters
to the personal representative, the sale of estate assets, the determination of claims against the estate, the settlement of fiduciary
accounts, and the determination of descent and distribution."7
Traditionally, these probate proceedings have been described as in
rem to signify that the estate property is within the court's jurisdiction and that the court's decrees affecting the property are binding
on all interested parties.4" Earlier cases indicated that no notice
is needed in probate proceedings because of judicial control over
the assets, 9 but this position fails to recognize that the court
must determine the rights of individuals in these assets. If the
due process concept is to be a meaningful guardian of the individual's property rights, his interest in an estate cannot be finally
adjudicated until he has "had reasonable notice and an opportunity
to be heard.""0
Realistically, the notice required in an in rem proceeding like
probate cannot be as extensive as in an in personam action because probate proceedings determine the interests of an uncertain
number of individuals whose interests, names, and addresses may
not be known.5 The Mullane case, however, provides the criterion for determining the adequacy of the notice needed to secure
a final order under these circumstances. Ordinarily, this would
consist of publication coupled with a mailing to those persons
whose interests, names, and addresses can be ascertained with
due diligence. It is difficult to deny the applicability of the Mullane
doctrine to probate proceedings both because of the similarity
between trust and probate proceedings and because of the Su§§ 310.04, 311.03, 324.18 (Supp. 1963). See generally Levy, Probate
in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate
Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 420, 424; Note, Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co.-Statutory Reaction, 39 IOWA L. REV.
665, 668 n.22 (1954).
47. SIMES & BAsYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 493 (1946); Tilley, The
Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, Mich. S.B.J., Jan. 1951, pp. 12,
15-16, 19.
48. LADD & BOYD, IOWA PROBATE PRACTICE 3 n.5 (1957); SIMES
& BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 489-504 (1946); Note, 50 MICH.
L. REV. 124, 127-29 (1951).
49. SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 505 (1946). But see discussion at 491-504 citing probate cases in which notice was required. As
to differences over the definition of probate res, see id. at 517-21.
50. SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 505-06, 516 (1946).
51. RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES 573-74 (2d ed. 1955);
SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 505-06, 516 (1946).

STAT.
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preme Court's refusal to judge the adequacy of notice in terms of

in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam jurisdiction. 2

Although a probate proceeding consists of a series of court orders, a number of jurisdictions treat the administration of an estate
as a single proceeding, requiring notice only at the commencement of the proceeding and requiring no additional notice when
3
the court subsequently enters any decree relating to the estate.
Where this is the case, the initial notice must certainly be reasonable.' At the same time, however, some of these jurisdictions
may treat the sale of realty and the decree of heirship as being
entirely independent proceedings requiring separate notice; 5
moreover, state statutes sometimes provide for additional notice
with respect to claims contests and hearings on the personal representative's final report.-6 Subsequent probate notice may also
be required by due process considerations. Of special significance
in this connection is the refusal of the Court in Mullane to regard
the adequate notice given when a trust joined the common fund as
being of any effect with respect to the hearing on the first ac-

count 15 months later, even though the original mailing included

a copy of the statute providing for mailed notice of the accounting
proceeding. To be safe under the Mullane doctrine, adequate
notice should be given whenever a final order is sought in probate
proceedings that might deprive interested parties of their property
rights.5"
52. Hayward, supra note 43, at 56-57; Levy, supra note 46, at 43849; Tilley, supra note 47, at 14-20; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257 (1957);
Note, 37 IOWA L. REV. 74, 78, 81 (1951); Note, 50 MICH. L. REV.
124, 138 (1951); Note, 27 U. CINC. L. REV. 76, 86 (1958); 1950 Wis.
L. REV. 688. But see In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d
894 (1953); Tilley, supra at 19; Note, 50 MICH. L. REV., supra at 129-39;
Note, 32 WASH. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1957).
53. SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW, 448-49, 506-15,
526 (1946). See also MODEL PROBATE CODE § 62 (Simes 1946); Basye,
supra note 31, at 737, 743-44 (1956); Note, 50 MICH. L. REV. 124,
136 (1951).
54. SIMEs & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 510-15 (1946).
55. LADD & BOYD, op. cit. supra note 48, at 21-22; SIMES & BASYB,
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 449, 509-10 (1946); Basye, supra note 31, at
737.
56. LADD & BOYD, op. cit. supra note 48, at 37, 63-67; SIMEs &
BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 515 (1946).
57. See LADD & BOYD, op. cit. supra note 48, at 21-22, 37, 63-67;
Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 305, 316-17 (1951); Tilley, supra note 56, at 14-20;
Note, 45 IOWA L. REV. 134, 141-44 (1959); cf. Note, 32 WASH L.
REV. 165, 178-79 (1957), arguing that heirs are not entitled to notice of
an order awarding the homestead to the widow because the heirs were
notified of the representative's appointment and, pursuant to statute, could
request that the representative give them notice of certain pending probate
matters.
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When applying Mullane to probate proceedings, attention must
also be directed to the problem of defining "interested parties."
Since the time of death determines the heirs, devisees, or lega-

tees,58 such beneficiaries are clearly "interested parties" entitled

to adequate notice. In the event of a will, the intestate as well as
the testate beneficiaries should be notified because of a possible

will contest.

9

Less clear is the case of estate creditors. It is gen-

erally assumed, even after Mullane, that published notice will suf-

fice, but the Supreme Court has cast some doubt on this matter
where the names and addresses of creditors are known.6

Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly
applied the Mullane doctrine to probate proceedings, its subse-

quent reliance on the doctrine in analogous situations has raised the
possibility that it will do so when confronted with a probate case.0 '
Furthermore, under the Mullane doctrine, failure to give adequate
notice constitutes a jurisdictional defect rendering the proceeding

void, 62 and a statute of limitations will not afford any protec-58. At'common law, the title and right to possession of realty vested
instantly in the heirs or devisees, while the title and right to possession of
personalty passed to the personal representative for purposes of administration. LADD & BOYD, op. cit. supra note 48, at 21, 23; MODEL PROBATE
CODE § i24, comment (Simes 1946).
59. Tilley, supra note 47; at 17: "[IThe 'interested parties' are the heirs
at law or, after a will is admitted to probate, the devisees, legatees, and
trust beneficiaries, if any ....
" But see In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa
22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953).
60. See City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293
(1953) (bankruptcy). It has been argued that mailing is required to creditors whose names and addresses can be ascertained by the personal representative from an examination of decedent's records. Note, 32 WASH. L.
REV. 165, 178 (1957).
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 3(k) (Simes 1946) contains the following:
"Interested persons" means heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors or any
others having a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent being administered. This meaning may vary at different stages
and different parts of a proceeding and must be determined according
to the particular purpose and matter involved.
As to the persons entitled to notice under the Model Probate Code, see
note 45 supra. Although Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.010(15) (1959) defines
"interested persons" substantially the same as under the Model Probate
Code, creditors are entitled to mailed notice only when the court so orders.
Mo.-REV. STAT. § 472.100 (1959).
61. Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV.
L. REV-1257, 1264 (1957).
62. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation proceeding collaterally attacked); Levy, supra note 46, at 429-30,
437-38 (by -making lack of proper notice jurisdictional, it is more likely
that the proper -notice will be given); Note, 37 IOWA L. REV. 74, 79-80
(1951). As to the possible consequences-of failure to give notice to persons
specified in a, statute, see SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW
522-23 (1946).
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tion.63 As a minimum precaution, therefore, each state ought to
provide by statute64 for at least one mailed notice6 5 during the
63. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). The case dealt
with the validity of published and posted notice provided for in a New
York statute establishing the procedure to be followed in condemning
property rights required for a water supply. The statute also provided that
claims for damages by riparian owners were barred after three years. The
action to restrain continued diversion of water was brought by a riparian
owner after the expiration of three years on the basis of inadequate notice
of the condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court held that published
notices and notices posted off the owner's land were not adequate notice
of the condemnation proceedings where the owner's name and address were
readily ascertainable from both tax rolls and deed records. Standard Oil
Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), cannot be cited for the proposition
that a statute of limitations will foreclose an attack based on inadequate
notice. In that case, the Court sustained an escheat proceeding based on published notice since the names and addresses of the interested parties were,
of course, unknown.
With respect to estate creditors, however, it is important to remember
that while a nonclaims period is started by a notice to creditors where the
estate is being probated, nevertheless, many state statutes provide that the
claims of creditors will be barred after the expiration of a set time where
the estate is not administered and no notice to creditors is given. See
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 135 (Simes 1946); Basye, supra note 31, at 77475.

64. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hayward, supra note
43, at 59 ("notice not authorized by statute is nothing more than actual
notice and actual notice does not satisfy the constitutional requirements.").
65. A properly addressed notice sent by ordinary mail was sustained in
Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956), even though it was not
actually received by the interested party. Notice mailed to a known incompetent having no guardian was held to violate the requirements of
due process. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
Although posted notice has been a traditional form of probate notice,
Basye, supra note 31, at 743, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
would sustain such notice in probate proceedings in light of the Mullane
case. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), might be construed as indicating by implication that under proper circumstances, posted
notice will satisfy the due process requirement. The Court there held that
posting was not sufficient notice of the condemnation proceedings where
the plaintiffs property was vacant at the time of posting, the posting was
done in the general vicinity but not on the plaintiff's property, and the
plaintiffs name and address as owner of the property were readily ascertainable from both tax rolls and deed records. The Court's language in
Schroeder suggests that posting might be adequate notice if placed on the
property affected by the proceeding in a place where the owner is known to
be likely to see it. 371 U.S. at 213. Certainly, notice posted on the property would not be sufficient if the property is known to be unoccupied. In
the Mullane case, the Court stated that notice by posting is reinforced by
seizure of the property. 339 U.S. at 316. Possession of the decedent's property by the estate representative does not, however, constitute a seizure
where the beneficiaries have not been in possession of the property. Moreover, the representative, like the trustee in Mullane, does not constitute a
caretaker for the beneficiaries' interests in all situations because his interests may conflict with the beneficiaries as in an accounting proceeding. See
note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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period of administration to the heirs, devisees, and legatees whose
names and addresses can be ascertained with due diligence. 8
Im.

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO FIDUCIARIES

Among the foremost needs of modem probate practice is adequate authority for the personal representative to manage the estate assets. The increasingly complex and diverse forms of decedents' investments make it imperative that personal representatives
have power to take whatever action is required to pay creditors
and transmit the remainder of the assets in the most advantageous form to the beneficiaries or their guardians or trustees.
If there is to be an expansion of the management powers of
personal representatives, some attention must be given to statutory
organization. Because of the similarities and interrelationships in
the management needs of estate fiduciaries, a number of states
have enacted general statutory provisions governing decedents'
repre entatives, trustees, and guardians. In many instances the
Uniform FiduciariesAct has been adopted,"7 but in other cases
more extensive provisions have been enacted." Even though differences in the purposes of administration require variations in
the handling of decedents' estates, guardianships, and trusts, certain common management problems exist. This is especially true
where estate planning, death, and incompetency combine to subject one estate to all three types of administration. Accordingly, it
seems desirable to include a section on fiduciaries in a model estates code. Where, however, material differences in the nature of
the fiduciary responsibility exist, the applicable statute should be
inserted in the probate, guardianship, or trust section of the code. 9
66. As to the meaning of "due diligence" under Mullane, see Note, 32
WASH. L. REv. 165, 178; Note, 32 IND. L.J. 469, 479-81 (1957).
67. The following 25 jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act:. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho,

Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
9B UNiFoRM LAWS ANN. 16 (Supp. 1962).
68. Such general fiduciary statutes usually include provisions for the ap-

pointment, qualification, removal, discharge, substitution, and compensation
of fiduciaries and proper investments and accounting for fiduciaries. Various uniform acts are sometimes included. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15210 (1953) (guardians and decedents' estates representatives); DEL. CODE

ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3301-08 (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178(251)-(311)
(1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-1 to 37-15 (1950) (includes Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Uniform Trusts Act, Uniform Common Trust Fund Act, Uniform Principal and Income Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.932.946, .1043 (1950) (trustees and guardians); TEX. PROB. CODE §§ 178-

372 (1956) (guardians and decedents' estates representatives).
69. MODEL PROBATE CODE 14 (Simes 1946).
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When examining fiduciary powers, two basic concepts must be
considered. The first is the relationship of the fiduciary to the estate, third persons, and the beneficiaries; the second is the extent
of the fiduciary's powers.
A.

STATUS OF THE FIDucIARY

1.

Relationship to the Estate

As to the relationship of the fiduciary to the estate, it is essential
to bear in mind that an "estate" is not regarded as an entity for
purposes of administration.7" Unlike a corporation, an estate has
no capacity to act; the administrative powers and duties are vested
in the fiduciary.7 Furthermore, the fiduciary is personally liable
to third persons for the consequences of his acts, and while he
may have a right of reimbursement from the
estate, his liability
72
is not limited to the extent of the estate assets.
In discussing the entity concept of the estate prior to the Model
Probate Code, Professor Atkinson concluded that even though
there might be advantages in treating an estate as an entity, such
a restructuring of administration concepts would bewilder the legal
profession.7" Accordingly, the Model Probate Code abides by tradition and does not adopt the entity theory. Some of its provisions,
however, are consistent with the entity concept.7 Thus, a parallel exists with the Uniform PartnershipAct, where the draftsmen
declined to recognize the partnership as an entity, 75 but nevertheless, codified the consequences of the theory in particular
situations."
2.

Relationshipto Third Persons

Consistent with its rejection of the entity concept, the Model
ProbateCode does not limit the personal liability of the representative to third persons arising out of his contracts or torts. The
70. An estate may be treated as an entity for other purposes. See
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 641(a).
71. ATKINSON, WILLS § 107 (2d ed. 1953); Atkinson, Old Principles and
New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
137-38 (1939); 36 IOWA L. REV. 377, 378 (1951).
72. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 262, 264 (2d ed. 1956); 36 IOWA L. REV.

377, 380-81 (1951).
73. Atkinson, supra note 71, at 137-38.
74. See, e.g., MODEL PROBATE CODE § 136 (Simes 1946), authorizing
the treatment of a separate action against the personal representative for
the decedent's liabilities as a claim filed against the estate.
75. CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS § 3 (2d ed. 1952).
76. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 8(3), authorizing ownership
of real property in partnership name, § 25, setting out limitations on the
rights of partners in partnership property.

1963]

MODEL ESTATES CODE

possibility of such a restriction does exist in section 131, which
authorizes the court to order continuation of the decedent's business. That section specifically states that the court may indicate
in its order the extent of the personal representative's liability for
debts resulting from the operation of the business.' The draftsmen of the Code approached this exception to the general rule of
liability cautiously by making it a matter of judicial discretion.
In contrast to the Model Probate Code, other statutes have moved
in the direction of eliminating the contractual liability of fiduciaries to third persons. Section 23 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides that a fiduciary shall not be personally liable to
a corporation as a holder of or subscriber to shares.7 8 The Uniform Trust Act codifies the common-law rule permitting a trustee
to exclude himself from personal liability on a contract. 9 Pennsylvania has restated the Uniform Trusts provision in more positive terms and made it applicable to both personal representatives and trustees; 0 its statute provides that if a fiduciary discloses that he is contracting as a fiduciary, he will not be personally
liable on any written contract within the scope of his authority.
With respect to tort liability, the Pennsylvania law authorizes the
fiduciary to insure against liability to third persons at estate expense."1 These statutory attempts to deal with the personal liability of fiduciaries demonstrate the need for a thorough re-examination of the contractual and tort liability of fiduciaries to
third persons.8 2
3.

Relationship to Beneficiaries

Limiting the personal liability of fiduciaries to third persons
does not, of course, relieve estate representatives of their fiduciary
duties to the beneficiaries of the estate. In administering the estate, a fiduciary is subject to a duty of care and loyalty. The existence of this obligation is well established at common law, 8 but
77. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 131(b) (Simes 1946).
78. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 23 (1953).
79. UNIFORM TRUSTS AT § 12(3). See also §§ 12-14 as to the contract

and tort liability of the trustee and trust estate. For the common-law rule,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 262-63 (1959).

80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.522, .939 (1950). See also ORE.

REV. STAT. §§ 126.215, 126.290 (1961).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.503, .933 (1950). See 3 SCOTT,
TRUSTS § 264 (2d ed. 1956). See also UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 13, relating

to the right of the trustee to exoneration or reimbursement for tort liability.
82. See TRUST Div., AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, TRUST AND ESTATE
LEGISLATION 174-75 (1961); Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians
of Property, 45 IowA L. REV. 264, 299-300, 333 (1960); King, Protecting
a Fiduciary from Personal Liability, Prac. Law., Nov. 1955, pp. 11-14.
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Tolversen, 190 Minn. 410, 252 N.W. 423 (1934).
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it has not always been clearly articulated in statutory form. This
duty is so fundamental that it should be adequately and carefully
dealt with by statute to the greatest possible extent.
Under the common law, the fiduciary is not an insurer of the
safety of the estate funds and is not liable for mere errors in

judgment.8 4 However, he is required to act in good faith and to
exercise that degree of care and prudence in the management of
the estate that ordinarily prudent men exercise in regard to their
own affairs.8 5 Section 172 of the Model Probate Code provides
that the personal representative shall be liable for his negligence
in the performance of certain functions.8 " This section neither sets
forth a general standard of care nor encompasses all aspects of
the fiduciary's administration. By way of contrast, the Model Prudent Man Investment Act has adopted a variation of the commonlaw standard of care and provides that:
In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling and
managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing,
which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income as well as the probable safety of their capital ....

For purposes of clarity, an estates code should contain a statutory definition of the requisite standard of care and should make
it applicable to all of the fiduciary's acts."8 In this broad context, some question might be raised as to whether the same criter84. Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 261, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913).
85. Speight v. Gaunt, 9 App. Cas. 1, 19, 20 (1883) (Lord Blackburn).
86. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 172(c) (Simes 1946), which provides:
Every personal representative shall be liable and chargeable in his accounts for neglect or unreasonable delay in collecting the credits or other assets of the estate or in selling, mortgaging, or leasing the property of the estate; for neglect in paying over money or delivering property of the estate he shall have in his hands; for failure to account for
or to close the estate within the time provided by this Code; for any
loss to the estate arising from his embezzlement or commingling of
the assets of the estate with other property; for loss to the estate
through self-dealing; for any loss to the estate arising from wrongful
acts or omissions of his co-representatives which he could have prevented by the exercise of ordinary care; and for any other negligent
or willful act or nonfeasance in his administration of the estate by
which loss to the estate arises.
See also MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3178(286), (294)(1962).
87. MODEL PRUDENT MAN INVESTMENT ACT § 1. See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (1953); SIMES & FRATCHER, CASES ON FIDUCIARY
ADMINISTRATION 148-49 (2d ed. 1956).
88. See TEX. PROB. CODE § 230 (1956) (executor, administrator, and
guardian to take care of and manage the estate property as a prudent man
would his own property).
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ion ought to apply to guardians, trustees, and decedents' representatives, and whether the common-law terminology adequately reflects the proper degree of conservatism required of these fiduciaries. It might, therefore, be more accurate to state the degree of
care as that which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances, or that which ordinarily prudent guardians,
trustees, or decedents' representatives would exercise under the
circumstances. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that such differences in language would materially affect a court's determination of liability.8 9
In addition to his duty of care, the fiduciary has a duty of loyalty." Statutes dealing with the duty of loyalty are of two types;
they either permit self-dealing or they prohibit it completely. By
implication, the Model Probate Code apparently permits self-dealing, for it provides merely that the personal representative shall
be liable for any loss to the estate resulting from self-dealing.91
The alternative is illustrated by the provisions of the Uniform Trusts
Act that prohibit a trustee from lending trust funds to himself 2
and from dealing in property with the trust.93 Although it is unlikely that a trust would ever benefit by lending money to the trustee, it might benefit from either a sale of trust assets to him or
a purchase of assets from him, if the transaction is surrounded by
sufficient safeguards. Since the Model Probate Code deals only
indirectly with the problem, further clarification of the duty of
loyalty is warranted.'
89. See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541 (2d ed. 1960); 2 SCOTT,

TRUSTS § 174 (2d ed. 1956).
90. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1929).
91. See note 86 supra. See also MODEL PROBATE CODE § 155 (Simes
1946). But see proscriptions on self-dealing by guardians, id. §§ 226,
230(b), 252.
92. UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 3.

93. Id. § 5. Section 6 prohibits the sale of property from one trust to

another, while § 7 precludes a corporate trustee from purchasing its own

stock for the trust. On the other hand, § 4 permits a corporate trustee,
upon providing adequate security, to deposit funds with itself pending investment, distribution, or payment of debts. See 2 SCOTT, TRUsTs § 170

nn.3-5 (2d ed. 1956) for a listing of statutes expressly prohibiting self-

dealing by fiduciaries. See also Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 627, 643 n.102 (1962).

94. The choices available to the revisers are illustrated by IOWA PRO-

BATE CODE § 159 (1963):

No fiduciary shall in any manner deal with himself, and shall derive
no profit other than his distributive share in the estate from the sale
or liquidation of any property belonging to the estate;

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 86-303 (1949):
Neither a trustee nor any of his agents may take part in any transaction concerning the trust in which he or any one for whom he acts

as agent has an interest, present or contingent, adverse to that of his
beneficiary, except as follows:
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Even if the duties of care and loyalty are specified in an estates
code, the fiduciary may be relieved of these duties by means of
an exculpatory clause. 5 Courts generally have strictly construed
or held invalid as against public policy exculpatory clauses that
seek to lower the standards to which fiduciaries are held by law."
Notwithstanding this judicial attitude, the Uniform Trusts Act expressly denies the settlor or beneficiaries the right to remove prohibitions on the trustee's borrowing of money from the trust and
dealing in property with the estate,9" and a New York statute invalidates any attempt to provide for the exoneration from liability of an executor or testamentary trustee where he fails to exer9
cise reasonable care. s
B.

POWERS OF THE FIDUCIARY

1.

Express and Implied Powers

The extent of a fiduciary's powers is not altogether clear. Although a few specific powers are accorded him by the common
law, 99 a fiduciary for the most part can exercise only those pow1. When the beneficiary, having capacity to contract, with full
knowledge of the motives of the trustee, and of all other facts concerning the transaction which might affect his own decision, and without the use of any influence on the part of the trustee permits him to
do so;
2. When the beneficiary, not having capacity to contract, the property court, upon the like information of the facts, grants the like permission; or,
3. When some of the beneficiaries, having capacity to contract,
and some not having it, the former grant permission for themselves,
and the proper court for the latter, in the manner above prescribed.
For additional alternatives, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 583; MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27.3178(252), (288) (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 86301 to -311 (1955); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-01-09 to -18 (1960);
S.D. CODE §§ 59.0106 -. 0115 (1939); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 543 (2d ed. 1960); Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REV. 264, 321-25 (1960).
95. In recent years, there appears to have been a substantial decline in
the use of exculpatory clauses in trust instruments. See BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 542, at 474--75 (2d ed. 1960).
96. See Countiss v. Whiting, 306 I11. App. 548, 29 N.E.2d 277 (1940):
cf. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
248 U.S. 564 (1918).
97. UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT §§ 17-18. See also § 19, empowering the
court to relieve a trustee who has acted honestly and reasonably from
lia-ility under the act.
98. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 125. With respect to statutory provisions relating to exculpatory clauses, see BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 5A2 (2d ed. 1960).
99. For example, the personal representative has power to compromie
claims of third persons against the estate and to sell personal property.
ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 117, 122 (2d ed. 1953).
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ers expressly conferred on him by statute or by instrument.'0
Aside from these express powers, the fiduciary cannot be certain

as to what additional powers he has. Although a corporation has

1
by implication all those powers necessary to achieve its purposes,"'

the fiduciary cannot assume that the law allows him to exercise

any power that he may reasonably deem appropriate to the efficient administration of the estate.10 2 As a consequence, a major
portion of estate planning is devoted to the drafting of powers
clauses that will enable the fiduciary to cope with the complex

problems of contemporary administration.
The Model Probate Code grants the personal representative and
the guardian numerous powers that can be exercised pursuant to
court order. 10 3 Some jurisdictions have sought to expand the

powers of trustees by codifying the standard clauses used in inter
Thus, the statutory apvivos and testamentary instruments.'
proach has been to enumerate powers rather than to rely on any
concept of implied or inherent powers. 1 5 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania 10 6 and Colorado' have statutes that refer to the inherent
100. BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 (2d ed. 1960). See also
In re Estate of Munger, 168 Iowa 372, 150 N.W. 447 (1915); Fratcher,
supra note 94, at 627.
101. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 185 (1961).
102. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES § 551 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEAmNT (SECOND), TRusTs § 186 (1959). The Supreme Court of Iowa has
stated:
The powers, duties and obligations of the executor or administrator
with respect to the estate are defined and limited by the will or statute. He has no implied powers beyond those necessary to effectuate
the powers expressly conferred ....
In re Estate of Munger, 168 Iowa 372, 375, 150 N.W. 447, 449 (1915).
103. MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 126 (compromise of claims held by
the estate), 147 (compromise of claims against the estate), 158-59 (sale of
personalty) (Simes 1946). See notes 100 supra and 111 inira.
104. The following statutes relate to the powers of trustees: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 58-116 (Supp. 1961); FLA. STAT. § 691.03 (1951); IOWA PROBATE
CODE § 699 (1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.24 (1961); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT., art. 7425b-25 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 30.99.070 (1963). See
generally Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 627,
629-39, 659-60 (1962). For a discussion of statutes permitting courts to confer powers on trustees, see id. at 655-56, 659. As to guardians, see CL.
PROB. CODE § 1853, which allows the court discretion to grant the conservator additional powers which are extensively enumerated; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1144.1-.9 (Supp. 1962), which provides that the powers
of guardians shall be the same as trustees with respect to certain specified
powers.
105. For the distinction between inherent and implied powers, see
STEPHENSON, DRAFrING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS, ADMImiSTRATIVE
PROVISIONS § 2.1 (1952).
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.523, .951, .1044 (1950).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-10-13 (1953).
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powers of the fiduciary, and a Louisiana statute deals with implied
powers. 10s
Since tradition and certainty necessitate a comprehensive statutory statement of fiduciary powers, the revisers of the Model Probate Code should ascertain the need for including additional powers. Moreover, it would seem advisable to consider the desirability

of a provision relating to implied powers.1

9

Another matter that

should be considered is the need for a specific court order relating to the exercise of any given power. Although the court historically has played a greater role in the supervision of decedents'
estates and guardianships than of trusts,"' it is common in the
modem will to grant the same powers to the executor as are granted to the testamentary trustee, and to permit the exercise of these
powers without obtaining a court order."'
108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.1991 (1951).
109. Testamentary and inter vivos instruments, after enumerating various specific powers, often conclude by providing that the fiduciary shall
also be authorized:
To do all the acts, . . . in his judgment needful or desirable for the
proper and advantageous management of the trust estate, to the same
extent and with the same effect as might legally be done by an individual in absolute ownership and control of the said property.
STEPHENSON, op. cit. supra note 105, § 2.47, at 43. See OKLA. STAT.
tit. 60, § 171 (1961), which provides that trusts may be created with power in the trustee to do certain specified acts "and generally to do any
lawful act in relation to such trust property which any individual owning
the same absolutely might do."
The Model Business Corporation Act sets forth certain corporate powers
and concludes by providing that:
Each corporation shall have power:
iri To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 4(r) (1953).
110. SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 462-64 (1946).
111. After setting forth the powers, the will might state: "To exercise
any and all the foregoing rights, powers, and discretion without giving
prior notice to any person and without first obtaining an order of court
therefor." STEPHENSON, op. cit. supra note 105, § 2.36, at 36. See generally
Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely
Held Business, 44 IOWA L. REV. 83, 95-96 (1958); materials cited in note
126 infra. See also MODEL PROBATE CODE § 151 (Simes 1946):
When power to sell, mortgage, lease or exchange property of the estate has been given to any personal representative under the terms of
any will, the personal representative may proceed under such power,
or may proceed under the provisions of this Code, as he may determine.
In adapting § 126 and § 147 of the Model Probate Code, which deal
with the compromise of claims held by and against the estate, the new
Iowa Code eliminates any requirement of a court order with only one exception. IOWA PROBATE CODE §§ 114-15 (1963). The Iowa Code also authorizes the sale of personal property of a perishable nature or for which
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The Power to Delegate

An ancillary problem is posed by the fiduciary's need for assistance in the administration of particular aspects of an estate.
Historically, a fiduciary has not been allowed to delegate many
of his responsibilities to others." 2 In general, this rule is sound,
for efficient administration is fostered by centralizing responsibility
in the fiduciary and holding him accountable for the proper
handling of the estate. Unfortunately, however, if this restriction
on delegation is applied strictly, the fiduciary may be foreclosed
from utilizing the services of third persons whose aid would be of
benefit to the estate.
To facilitate administration, statutes have been enacted authorizing the delegation of specific fiduciary responsibilities." Although in Pennsylvania personal representatives, trustees, and
guardians are authorized to perform any acts of administration
through attorneys-in-fact, the statute specifically provides that this
does not authorize the delegation of any discretionary power."'
there is a regularly established market without court order. IOWA PRO-

BATE CODE § 387(1) (1963). Section 122 provides that "the acts of the fi-

duciary without prior approval of court after notice, may be contested by
any interested person at or before the entry of the order discharging the
fiduciary."

IOWA PROBATE CODE

§ 122 (1963).

112. See Bates v. Jones, 224 Ala. 83, 139 So. 242 (1932); Gaver v.
Early, 191 Cal. 123, 215 Pac. 394 (1923). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES §§ 555-57 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEfENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 171 (1959); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 171-171.4 (2d ed. 1956); SLIEs &
FRATCHER, CASES ON FIDUcIARY ADMINISTRATION 147-48 (2d ed. 1956);
Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REV.

264, 325-26 (1960).
113. As to statutes:
(a) authorizing an agreement between a fiduciary and a surety that deposited funds of the estate shall not be withdrawn without the consent of
the surety, see MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 108, 198 (Simes 1946); BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 556, at 80-81 (2d ed. 1960); Fratcher, Powers
and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REV. 264, 326 (1960);
(b) authorizing investment in mutual funds securities, see BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 679, at 311-13 (2d ed. 1960); 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS
§ 227.9A (2d ed. 1956);
(c) authorizing an attorney-in-fact to conduct a sale of property, see
CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924(a); GA. CODE § 4-104 (1933); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, §§ 320.509, .941, .1043 (Supp. 1962);
(d) authorizing voting by proxy, see ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 31 (1960); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 556, at 76-80 (2d
ed. 1960); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 193.3 (2d ed. 1956); UNIFORM TRUSTS
ACT § 8;
(e) authorizing conduct of business as a partnership or corporation, see
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 131(a) (Simes 1946).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.509a, .941a, .1043 (Supp. 1962).
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Statutes in Texas" 5 and Oklahoma"' authorize trustees to employ "attorneys, accountants, agents, and brokers reasonably necessary in the administration of the trust estate." A more comprehensive statute has been enacted in Iowa. Under that statute, the
court may authorize a fiduciary to
engage, at estate expense, outside specialists, and he may delegate to
them, or consult with them for advice regarding the performance of aspects of the estate management which require professional skills or facilities which he does not possess, or does not possess in sufficient degree, and he may employ, at estate expense, subordinates and agents to
perform ministerial acts and carry on or complete details
7 of estate business under the policies and terms established by him."

It is further provided that the fiduciary shall not be liable personally for the conduct of the person engaged unless such conduct
would constitute a breach of duty by the fiduciary had he been

the actor and, in addition, the fiduciary had either directed or
approved the conduct or had failed to exercise proper care in the

selection or supervision of the person engaged."'
3.

Powers of Co-Fiduciaries

Where there are two or more personal representatives, the Model
Probate Code requires that they must all join in the exercise of
certain specified powers although other powers can be exercised
by any one of them." 9 While statutes may differ as to whether

action should be taken by all,"'

by a majority,"' or by only

115. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 7425b-25(H) (1960). For similar provisions concerning trustees and executors, see ARK. STAT. ANN. 58-116(w)
(Supp. 1961).
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.24(H) (1961). See also CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1853, authorizing the court to grant to the conservator the power
to employ attorneys, accountants, investment counsel, agents, depositaries, and employees at estate expense.
117. IOWA PROBATE CODE § 84 (1963). See also BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 557 (2d ed. 1960); Note, Delegation of Fiduciary Duties, 46
IOWA L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1960).
The English Trustee Act of 1925 makes broad provision for the delegation of fiduciary duties. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, §§ 23,
25. See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 555, at 59-62 (2d ed. 1960).
118. IOWA PROBATE CODE § 85 (1963). Section 86 authorizes the court
to reduce the fiduciary's fee where the services rendered by the person
engaged would normally be performed by the fiduciary. Id. § 86.
119. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 102 (Simes 1946). See also IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 7-410 (1953) (based on the Model Probate Code), -411 (where
all are required to act and there is disagreement, the court shall direct the
action upon petition).
120. E.g., IOWA PROBATE CODE § 76 (1963) (in the event of a deadlock,
fiduciaries may apply to the court, which shall direct).
121. UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 11 (majority may act where there are
more than three trustees). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.519, .949
(1950) (where there is no majority, the court may direct upon petition);
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one of the fiduciaries, 12 2 some provision should be made concerning fiduciaries who do not participate in the action. Thus,
the Uniform Trusts Act stipulates that no trustee shall be liable to
the beneficiaries for the consequences of any act in which he has
not participated." s If he is directed by the majority trustees to
join in the act, he can relieve himself of any liability for the action
by filing a written dissent with any of his co-trustees at or before the time of the joinder. Moreover, in any statute requiring
more than one fiduciary to act, it would12 also
be desirable to set
forth a procedure for resolving a deadlock.
CONCLUSION
Because of its comprehensive analysis and organization of probate and guardianship law," the Model Probate Code has been
the single factor most responsible for statutory improvements in
these fields. At the same time, the 17 years since the publication of
the Code have wrought significant changes in estate planning and
administration. As a consequence, the Model Probate Code is now
under revision.
The revisers of the Code are, of course, immediately confronted
with specific problems of probate and guardianship law that need
re-examination. 6 Nevertheless, they cannot confine their efforts
to the redrafting of a few provisions within the existing structure
of the Code. Instead, their task is not unlike that of the drafters of
the Uniform Commercial Code, for changed circumstances require
an integrated statutory approach to the problems of trust, probate,
and guardianship administration. This result can best be achieved
through a Model Estates Code.
Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627, 637
(1962).
122. E.g., TEX. PROB. CODE § 240 (1956).
123. UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 11(1). Section 11(2) states that this provision does not excuse a co-trustee from liability for inactivity in the administration of the trust nor for failure to attempt to prevent a breach of
trust. For similar provisions, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.519
(personal representatives), .949 (trustees) (1950).
124. See notes 119-21 supra.
125. For a comprehensive survey of the Code, see Niles, Model Probate
Code and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REV.
321 (1947).
126. For an incisive analysis and suggestions pertaining to the improvement of the Model Probate Code, see Rheinstein, Some Observations
on Wills Under the Indiana Probate Code of 1953, 30 IND. LJ. 152
(1955); Rheinstein, The Model Probate Code: A Critique, 48 COLUM.
L. REv. 534 (1948). As to simplifying and dispensing with the administration of estates, see Basye, StreamliningAdministration Under the New Texas
ProbateCode, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 165, 170-87 (1956).

